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The formalization of rural people’s rights to agricultural and forest land is a key 
policy focus for many developing countries (Larson et al. 2010; Deininger and Hilhorst 
2013). These reforms can improve marginalized people’s wellbeing by securing their hold on 
durable income-yielding assets, especially where land ownership is culturally prized (Holden 
et al. 2013; Lawry et al. 2014). However, other studies suggest that formalizing de facto land 
tenure may have negligible or detrimental effects, both economic and subjective (Sjaastad 
and Cousins 2008; Bose 2011, 2013).  India’s Forest Rights Act of 2006 formalizes the rights 
of indigenous people to the government forestland that they have been using illegally 
(Government of India 2006). To estimate the results of this major reform, the author and her 
research assistant conducted 200 household surveys and 42 interviews with indigenous 
farmers in Gujarat, India. 
Although the Forest Rights Act is one of the most thorough attempts at forest tenure 
reform in South Asia, there is little published research on its results. This paper uses 
regression models complemented by qualitative data to estimate the effects of formal 
forestland rights on households’ economic outcomes and subjective life satisfaction. Logistic 
regressions indicate a strong correlation between indigenous households’ land rights and 
access to government benefits. According to these models, a household with formal land 
rights was 8.9% more likely to have received a subsidized borewell, and 16.5% more likely 
have received a home renovation subsidy, than an identical household without rights 
(p=0.041, p=0.009). There was no significant correlation between formal rights and farm 
income, rights and food security, nor rights and life satisfaction, perhaps due to pre-existing 
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These Rights Have No Use? Forest Land Rights and the Economic and 
Subjective Wellbeing of Indigenous People in India1 
 
1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Formalizing the land rights of the rural poor is a popular poverty alleviation strategy 
in developing countries, one promoted by development agencies (Nyamu-Musembi 2007; 
Holden et al. 2013). In addition to strengthening agricultural land tenure, developing nations 
are also recognizing the forestland rights of indigenous people in the hope of reducing 
deforestation or improving natural resource management (Larson et al. 2010; Kunz et al. 
2016). In 2016 alone, Indonesia, Cameroon, Peru, Liberia, Panama, and Mali transferred 
rights over forests from their respective central governments to local communities (Hatcher 
and Luke 2010; Rights and Resources Initiative 2017). The recognition of forest tenure has 
gained additional urgency as a prerequisite for the equitable implementation of REDD+, a 
“payment for ecosystem services” scheme (Larson et al. 2013; Naughton-Treves and 
Wendland 2014; Kunz et al. 2016). 
India’s Forest Rights Act of 2006 (FRA) allows the transfer of rights to own and use 
forestland from the central government to indigenous adivasi people and other forest-
dwelling people who were using it illegally (Government of India 2006). Prior to the FRA, 
the government prosecuted those people for farming and living in the forest. The FRA 
incorporates agricultural and forest tenure reforms: it grants households Individual Forest 
Rights (IFR)2 to the land they were farming or living on as of December 2005, and grants 
villages a range of Community Forest Rights (CFR), such as the right to harvest non-timber 
forest products (ibid). 
The FRA could improve the lives of 147 million Indians  who live in or near forests, 
one of the largest such populations in the world,  but only three papers on its effects have 
been published thus far (Bose 2011, 2013; Bandi 2015b). My research blends both 
quantitative and qualitative methods: with a research assistant and two enumerators, I 
conducted a household survey of 200 IFR applicant households  and about 40 interviews in 5 
Bhil adivasi villages in Gujarat, India. I developed logistic and linear regression models to 
help isolate the correlation between IFR and the potential outcomes for indigenous people’s 
wellbeing. Economists have used regression models to study the economic impacts of other 
formalization efforts (Deininger et al. 2007; Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010; Holden and 
Ghebru 2013), but my models also incorporate a subjective outcome (life satisfaction) and 
binary outcomes on government benefits. Furthermore, my qualitative data collection 
allowed me to ground-truth the variables in my models and provide additional context to the 
results. 
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1.1 The Forest Rights Act 
From the British Raj’s 1878 expropriation of the forests until the Forest Rights Act of 
2006, India’s central government has restricted access to state forestland for economic and 
environmental reasons (Pradip 2001; Menzies 2007). Marginalized people have continued 
living farming, and harvesting resources in forests. The areas they have cleared for 
agriculture have few but remain “government forestland” on paper, identical to standing 
forest. Without formal rights, forest-dwellers risk fines, crop destruction, beatings, eviction, 
and assault from the Forest Department, the agency charged with enforcement (Pimple and 
Sethi 2005; Bandi 2015a).  From 2002 to 2010 alone, the government evicted more than 
300,000 families from government forestland (Das 2013). Most forest-dwelling people 
belong to the “Scheduled Tribes,” the constitutionally recognized adivasi communities that 
form one of India’s most deprived minorities (Xaxa et al. 2014).  
In spite of affirmative action programs, Scheduled Tribes suffer from discrimination 
and extreme deprivation, with literacy lagging 20 percentage points behind the national 
average and widespread malnutrition and anemia (Xaxa et al. 2014). In Gujarat state, where I 
conducted this research, infant mortality among Scheduled Tribes is 80% higher than the 
statewide average (ibid). Instead of increasing adivasis’ quality of life, industrial projects and 
wildlife parks in India’s remote corners have caused poverty, displacement, and forced 
assimilation (Menzies 2007).   
The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest 
Rights Act) of 2006, known as the Forest Rights Act, aims to remedy “this historical 
injustice” and “ensur[e] livelihood and food security of the forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes 
and other traditional forest dwellers” (Government of India 2006). Since 2008, households 
have been  applying for Individual Forest Rights (IFR), a de jure formalization of de facto 
land use. Applicants must demonstrate that they belong to a Scheduled Tribe3 and provide 
proof of occupation and cultivation on their requested plot since late 2005.  The applications 
are vetted by a village Forest Rights Committee and then reviewed at the taluka (block), 
district, and state level (Bandi 2015a).  IFR transfers land ownership from the central 
government to households and IFR includes the rights to access, manage, and withdraw 
resources from the land, and to exclude other people from using it (Schlager and Ostrom 
1992). However, unlike private land rights, Individual Forest Rights are only alienable by 
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  “traditional	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  have	  been	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  implementation	  due	  to	  misinterpretations	  




1.2 Land Rights, Forest Rights 
Building on older studies about tenure security and agricultural productivity (Demsetz 
1967), de Soto (2000) argued that formal property rights would enhance the poor’s access to 
credit and thus build their wealth. He further claimed that a system of formal rights would 
improve a developing nation’s entire economy by increasing the capital available for 
investment and simplifying the collection of taxes. His theory underpins many of today’s 
land rights reforms (Nyamu-Musembi 2007; Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010).  
Scholars have raised both theoretical and empirical objections to de Soto’s theory. 
For example, many questioned the assumption that formal land title leads to credit, as poor 
farmers with land title remain unattractive borrowers from a bank’s perspective (Gilbert 
2002; van der Molen 2012). This theoretical critique has been borne out empirically in 
studies of tenure reform and credit access (e.g. Perz et al. 2014 on Bolivia) and a systematic 
review of agricultural property reforms – primarily formalization – in 18 countries (Lawry et 
al. 2014).   
Theorists have pointed out that de Soto’s argument redefines “secure tenure” as 
synonymous with “individual private land rights,” and thus redefines “legal pluralism” as 
“extra-legal” (Gilbert 2002; Nyamu-Musembi 2007; van der Molen 2016). Formalization 
supersedes the customary tenure arrangements and social interactions that govern rural land 
use in practice, resulting in conflict, gaps between de jure rights and existing de facto rights, 
and the diminishment of the rights of customary land users (Nyamu-Musembi 2007; Sjaastad 
and Cousins 2008). Formalization has led to the exclusion of women from land rights they 
previously enjoyed on the basis of family relationships or other customary roles, in India and 
abroad (Bose 2011, 2013; Nyamu-Musembi 2007; Ossome 2014; Lawry et al. 2014).  
 Finally, prioritizing formalization over the actual redistribution of land reifies the 
status quo (Nyamu-Musembi 2007; van der Molen 2016). Land-poor people remain land-
poor, their formal title limited to the land over which they already had de facto control.  In 
India, for example, the average approved IFR plot is just .63-.69 acres4 (CFRLA 2016, 44); 
gaining rights to such modest amounts of land may not yield measurable improvements in 
wellbeing.  Furthermore, local elites may capture the formalization process and use it to their 
own benefit, as seen with the IFR in India (Sjaastad and Cousins 2008; Bandi 2015). 
Redistribution of land is comparatively more beneficial.  In India, the economic and human 
capital benefits of agrarian tenancy reform paled in comparison to the benefits of 
redistributive reforms (Deininger et al. 2007).  
However, many impact evaluations, which employ cross-sectional and panel data to 
make causal inferences, 5 have found that formalizations helps the poor accumulate wealth. 
Studies from China, Thailand, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa have shown that 
rural people’s investment in agricultural land and agricultural assets increases with greater 
tenure security (Holden et al. 2013; Narh et al. 2016). Lawry et al. (2014) synthesized nine  
qualitative studies and 20 impact evaluations and found that formalization increased 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Data	  from	  MoTA	  and	  CRFLA	  reports	  as	  of	  July	  2016.	  Means	  calculated	  assuming	  normal	  distribution.	  




agricultural productivity and household consumption or income, except in Africa. A direct 
comparison of earlier Indian tenure reform to the FRA is difficult because those interventions 
also include a degree of redistribution (Deininger et al. 2007, Lawry et al. 2014).  
There are few published studies the results of the Forest Rights Act. Using panel data 
on IFR applicants, Bandi (2015b) found that adivasis in Gujarat experienced a modest 
increase in cereal and oilseed yields after receiving IFR. However, he attributes those 
improvements to secular trends like improved irrigation.  In Rajasthan, just across the state 
border from my field site, Bhil adivasis did not perceive any livelihood benefits from IFR 
(Bose 2013). They applied for IFR not to improve their livelihood but to force the 
government to acknowledge them as citizens, deserving the socioeconomic rights guaranteed 
by Indian law and fulfilled through government benefits (ibid; Das 2013). IFR created tenure 
insecurity for customary rights holders, namely Bhil women and nomads from other tribes 
(Bose 2011, 2013). Upon converting their own de facto claim into a de jure IFR title, the 
male heads of household began excluding female users who were previously guaranteed 
access through marriage, kinship, and group membership (ibid). Instead of the joint male-
female titles stipulated by law, states usually issued IFR titles in the name of the male only 






2.1 Site  
This study took place in five adivasi villages in the semi-arid hills of Santrampur 
Block, Mahisagar District, Gujarat, India. Gujarat was one of the first states to begin the IFR 
process, allowing time for potential benefits to become visible (Holden and Ghebru 2013, 
Lawry et al. 2014; CFRLA 2016). I selected these particular villages because they are 
homogenous in population. Nearly all residents are subsistence farmers from the Bhil 
Scheduled Tribe (Director 2011). Most importantly, many villagers filed IFR claims, and 
some households have received IFR titles while their neighbors have not. Finally, these 
villagers have excellent relations with my host NGO FES; this allowed me to create a rapport 
with my respondents and even live with (non-respondent) host families.   
The villages’ populations range from 
1,100 to 2,500 (Table 1). They are one hour 
from Santrampur, a city of 19,000, and 45 
minutes from the nearest bank or secondary 
school. Although adjacent to a reservoir,6 
villagers have no access to its water for 
irrigation and no plumbing. Their homes and 
the adjacent fields are dispersed along 
valleys (Image 1, 2).  The clusters of 
households, known as faliya, may be a 
kilometer apart. Steep hills surround each 
valley, covered by government forestland that 
is partly deforested and even under cultivation 
(Image 1, 2).  There is also some forestland in the valleys themselves. 
Table	  1:	  Village	  population	  and	  IFR	  approval	  rates	  
Village	  ID	   Population7	   	  %	  Bhil	  
Scheduled	  
Tribe	  8	  




%	  of	  HHs	  
approved	  
Village	  1	   1,080	   100%	   97	   71	   73.20%	  
Village	  2	   1,481	  	   >99.01%	  	   78	   57	   73.08%	  
Village	  3	   1,362	  	   100%	   211	   40	   18.96%	  
Village	  4	   2,504	  	   >98.72%	  	   193	   163	   84.46%	  
Village	  5	   1,295	  	   100%	   81	  	   3*	   3.70%*9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  reservoir	  flooded	  most	  of	  Village	  4	  in	  the	  1980s.	  The	  displaced	  families	  resettled	  and	  reformed	  the	  village	  on	  the	  
reservoir’s	  hilly	  banks,	  which	  are	  covered	  in	  forestland.	  In	  the	  1980s,	  they	  successfully	  resisted	  government	  attempts	  to	  
prevent	  them	  from	  clearing	  and	  plowing	  that	  land.	  
7	  Director	  2011	  
8	  Director	  2011.	  Note:	  The	  non-­‐ST	  population	  belongs	  to	  Scheduled	  Castes:	  8	  people	  in	  Village	  2	  and	  32	  in	  Village	  4.	  
9	  Most	  applicants	  in	  this	  village	  were	  claiming	  land	  they	  had	  not	  farmed;	  therefore,	  they	  were	  ineligible	  for	  IFR	  	  
5 













My research assistant Neelam 
Kanjani and I lived in each village for 
one to two weeks as guests of local 
families, conducting our surveys and 
interviews (Image 3). Due to field 
conditions, I could not select a simple 
random sample from a master-list of 
all IFR applicants. With support from 
our host NGO Foundation for 
Ecological Security (FES) we met with 
officers of the Forest Rights 
Committees that oversaw the IFR 
process in their communities. We 
compiled 5 village-wise lists of IFR 
applicants from their handwritten records. 
My goal was to have the same number of unapproved and approved households in the total 
sample and, if possible, in each village. We found in the course of our research that villages 
had different approval rates (Table 1). Therefore, I randomly selected 32-47 households per 
village for a total of 20010 households, 42% of them approved 11 (Table 2). Ms. Kanjani and I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Originally	  202.	  I	  excluded	  the	  household	  of	  a	  wealthy	  sarpanch	  (village	  president)	  and	  a	  dalit	  (Scheduled	  Caste)	  
household.	  As	  the	  only	  dalit	  family	  in	  the	  village,	  the	  latter	  family	  face	  discrimination:	  “The	  villagers	  practice	  
untouchability.	  They	  won't	  drink	  water	  we	  offer,	  let	  us	  use	  the	  bathroom,	  or	  even	  let	  our	  animals	  graze	  near	  their	  houses”	  	  
6 
Image	  2:	  Satellite	  image	  of	  typical	  villages	  in	  Santrampur	  Block	  
The	  oblong	  patches	  of	  brown	  are	  the	  villages,	  filled	  with	  fields	  and	  surrounded	  by	  hills.	  Each	  village	  we	  
sampled	  spans	  multiple	  valleys	  and	  has	  at	  least	  4	  faliyas.	  (Google	  Earth)	  
Image	  3:	  View	  from	  one	  host	  family’s	  house	  	  
	  
	  
personally conducted 134 of these surveys and a two-person enumeration team12 conducted 
the remaining 66. 
	  
Table	  2:	  Sample	  composition	  and	  IFR	  approval	  rates 
Village	  ID	   No.	  Households	  
surveyed	  




%	  of	  sample	  
approved	  	  
Village	  1	   40	   20%	   18	   20	   50%	  
Village	  2	   43	   22%	   17	   26	   59%	  
Village	  3	   38	   19%	   20	   18	   47%	  
Village	  4	   47	   23%	   22	   25	   53.2%	  
Village	  5*	   32	   16%	   29	   3*	   9.36%*	  
Total	   200	   100%	   106	   94	   48%	  
*Note:	  Only	  3	  households	  in	  the	  whole	  village	  received	  land	  rights	  
	  
2.3 Data Collection 
 The household survey captured information on each individual, including their age, 
education, employment, and migration; and household-level information on: IFR, private 
land ownership, and participation in local groups and committees.13  I included three 
economic variables associated with the formalization of land rights in the literature: assets, 
income, and food security. I based the survey on a survey from International Forestry 
Resources and Institutions (IFRI), which has been used in over 50 studies, and the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (IFRI 2013; Alkire and Santos 2014).  
 The survey also asked if the responding household had received a variety of 
government benefits in the preceding year; these benefits may influence economic outcomes 
or be the results of the law, since it legitimizes people’s once-illegal behavior and provides 
essential proof of land ownership (Bose 2011, 2013; Das 2013).  I added to the survey two 
open-ended questions about the Forest Rights Act, asking respondents why applications were 
rejected and what benefits IFR titles would or had brought them. Finally, I added an 
assessment of subjective wellbeing because formalization laws like FRA may yield 
subjective improvements in people’s wellbeing (World Bank 2006) and because the 
documented negative effects of such laws are primarily qualitative (Nyamu-Musembi 2007; 
Bose 2011, 2013). The question was a Cantril ladder, asking individual respondents to rate 
their life satisfaction from 1 to 10 (OECD 2011).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  I	  had	  to	  discard	  ~100	  surveys	  and	  conduct	  100	  more	  after	  other	  enumerators	  made	  up	  data.	  	  
12	  Kishorbhai	  and	  Manishbhai,	  forest	  rights	  activists	  from	  a	  Godhra-­‐based	  NGO	  




 My assistant Neelam Kanjani and I 
conducted 42 semi-structured interviews. We 
interviewed the officers of the village FRCs and 
other community leaders about the implementation 
of the Act, potential reasons for rejection, benefits 
of the IFR, and relationships with the Forest 
Department and between villagers before and after 
the FRA. We also interviewed household members 
about subjective wellbeing and asked personalized 
versions of the background questions. I based the 
household interview guides on an earlier study of 
wellbeing in adivasi communities in India, 
addressing the domains of health, economics, social 
connections, and agency (White, Gaines, and Jha 
2013). I recorded the gender and age of the 
individual respondent, since levels of subjective 
wellbeing vary across different demographic groups 
(OECD 2013).  
We collected data from May to August 
2015, spanning the field preparation and the 
planting (monsoon) seasons. My research assistant and I stayed in each village during data 
collection. We and our two enumerators visited each applicant’s home in pairs and surveyed 
them and/or other adult members of their household (Image 4). As per the Government of 
India census, a “household” included anyone who ate at the same stove as the IFR applicant 
unless they were away more than six of the preceding 12 months (Shukla 2010).   
2.4 Analytical Methods 
 I conducted bivariate analyses of all the characteristics of IFR and non-IFR 
households using Chi-squared tests, two-tailed t-tests and, for non-normal data, Wilcoxon 
rank sums.  I then built regression models14 for the variables that differed significantly 
between the two groups, such as on-farm income and government subsidies for borewells and 
house renovation (see Results).  I used logistic regression to model the relationship between 
IFR status and household participation in the two government programs, while controlling 
for potential confounders such as household-level social capital. I also developed OLS 
multivariate linear regression models of the relationship between IFR approval and farm 
income, and IFR and life satisfaction. Finally, I interpreted these results in the light of the 
interviews and responses to the survey’s open-ended questions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  I	  experimented	  with	  Propensity	  Score	  Matching	  but	  I	  could	  not	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  quality	  panel	  data	  and	  an	  inability	  to	  
make	  	  	  the	  necessary	  “assumption	  of	  conditional	  independence”,	  i.e.	  I	  knew	  that	  unobserved	  variables	  such	  as	  corruption	  
had	  influenced	  who	  received	  IFR	  ((Khandker	  et	  al.	  2009).	  
8 
Image	  4:	  Asking	  for	  directions	  to	  the	  next	  
household	  on	  our	  randomly-­‐generated	  list	  
	  
	  




3.1 Data Summary 
 94 of the households had received Individual Forest Rights but 106 had not (Table 2). 
The latter includes households that received notice of rejection and those whose applications 
were pending. Some households had applied as recently as 2015. Few repondents could 
recall when they knew they received IFR, and those that did reported delays between 
notification and receipt of their title documents.15 
 The average household had 7 people, with 4 working members (Table 3). Women 
headed only 11 households, but many individual respondents (~40%) were female.16 A 
majority of household heads was illiterate, in contrast to their children and grandchildren. On 
average, the most educated person per household had some high school education (Table 3). 
 Nearly every household farmed 
corn, rice, and other subsistence crops, 
sometimes complemented by chana dal, 
a cash crop (98.5%). In addition to 
selling surplus crops, they earned cash 
through migratory day labor (71.00%), 
salaried employment (10.50%), and 
small businesses (Table 3).  Private 
landholdings17 were extremely small. 
50% of the households owned one acre 
or less – and only one-fifth of that acre 
was reliably productive and fertile18 
(Table 3). 1.5% of households were 
landless. The distribution of private land 
was extremely skewed right due to the 
presence of a few larger landholders 
(Fig. 1).  
 In addition to private land, these households had been farming government forestland 
for decades, a typical situation for adivasis.19 Under the FRA, households can only apply for 
IFR to the forestland that they were cultivating and/or living on as of late 2005 (Government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Several	  said	  they	  received	  the	  title	  documents	  personally	  from	  then-­‐Chief	  Minister	  Narendra	  Modi	  at	  a	  festival	  in	  2011	  
or	  2013,	  months	  or	  years	  after	  being	  notified	  of	  IFR	  approval.	  Modi’s	  successor,	  CM	  Anandiben	  Patel,	  did	  the	  same	  August	  
2015.	  An	  interviewee	  described	  these	  delays	  as	  a	  political	  ploy,	  creating	  the	  impression	  that	  IFR	  were	  a	  gift	  from	  this	  
particular	  political	  party	  to	  adivasi	  voters.	  
16	  We	  spoke	  to	  1	  or	  more	  adults	  at	  each	  household,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  ~265	  respondents	  
17	  Private	  land	  owned	  by	  an	  individual	  household	  member	  and	  assigned	  a	  survey	  number.	  	  
18	  Piyat	  layak:	  Arable	  land	  with	  access	  to	  water	  and	  a	  gentle	  slope;	  i.e.	  fairly	  productive.	  Less	  fertile	  land	  is	  binpiyat	  layak,	  
arable	  land	  that	  is	  steep	  and/or	  dry,	  but	  still	  used	  for	  farming,	  i.e.	  low	  production.	  Households	  can	  “convert”	  binpiyat	  layak	  
land	  into	  piyat	  layak	  through	  irrigation	  and	  leveling.	  




of India 2006). 81% of households reported that they had met this criterion, indicating a 
widespread use of forestland in addition to private land. Households applied for IFR covering 
anywhere from 1/10 of an acre to 10 acres; the median request was 2 acres (Table 3). 
Although the law requires IFR titles to be issued in the name of the head of household and 
his spouse, 90% of applications were in the man’s name alone and 2% were joint. The 
remaining 8% of applicants were female (Table 3).  At the time of data collection, more 88% 
of households reported currently farming and/or living on forestland to which they did not 
have rights, including households that received IFR covering a fraction of their request and 
continued farming the whole plot regardless.	  
	   The amount of land approved per household was much smaller than requested, with a 
median of less than 3/4 acre and a distribution strongly skewed to the right (Fig. 2, 3). 25% 
of approved households received IFR to 0.45 acre or less and 75% received less than 1.25 
acres. Only 10% of approved households gained rights over the entire amount for which they 
applied.   When asked why the approved amounts were so small, respondents reported that 
they did not know, were missing documents, or had refused to pay necessary bribes. Other 
said that the Forest Department officials had measured their land incorrectly.  
 
 Households without IFR reported that they did not know why their claims were 
rejected or attributed it to: a long processing period, missing documents, corruption, the 
Forest Department previously preventing them from farming (thereby jeopardizing their 
eligibility), quarrels between villagers, the death of their household’s IFR applicant, or the 
limited amount of forestland available to be claimed.  The “missing document” was often a 
fine receipt, issued when the Forest Department caught and fined families for illegal 
cultivation or habitation. The receipts we examined were at least 25 years old. People who 
had never been caught, or who could not afford to pay the fine, never received them.  
Figure	  2:	  Amount	  of	  forestland	  applied	  for	  per	  
household,	  in	  units	  of	  1/40th	  acre	  (n=178) 
Figure	  3:	  Amount	  of	  forestland	  approved	  for	  IFR	  per	  




Although illegal, the Forest Department in many states has required applicants to present 
these receipts, with their outdated land measurements, to be considered for IFR20 (Das 2013).  
Over 68% of households had experienced problems meeting their food needs in the 
past year through their own farming and income (Table 4). Migratory day labor was the most 
common coping mechanism. In 72.14% of households, at one person had migrated 
temporarily in the past year (Table 3). They spent two weeks to six months outside the 
village, usually doing day labor. Anyone who had been away for than six months – usually 
for school or a salaried job – was excluded from the household, as per Indian census 
procedures (Shukla 2010).  When discussing their life satisfaction, respondents disparaged 
day labor and expressed hopes that increased crop production or salaried employment would 
render it obsolete.  
 Only 14.0% of household participated in local groups, such as women’s self-help 
groups, dairy co-operatives, or the statewide Gujarat Adivasi Federation (Table 3). Some 
households were home to members of village government committees: the Gram Panchayat 
(village council), the Joint Forest Management Committee, or the Forest Rights Act 
Committee (FRC). I compared households on the basis of these characteristics, as explained 
below.  
 
3.2 Bivariate Analyses 
Household with and without land rights were extremely similar. There were no 
significant differences between them in household composition, education, employment, 
migration, food insecurity, private land ownership, and local group or committee 
membership (Table 3). Only two variables varied significantly. The group with IFR had 
applied for significantly more land (p=0.0046, Wilcoxon rank sum), and had significantly 
roomier homes (p=0.0020, Wilcoxon rank sum) (Table 3).  
There was no correlation between IFR and Gram Panchayat membership, nor 
between IFR and membership in the FRC – surprising considering that such elites have 
captured the IFR process elsewhere (Bandi 2015a, Das 2013). The FRC officers we 
interviewed were literate and intimately familiar with the Act, but nonetheless were rejected 
for IFR. The FRCs reported that they approved nearly all applications, indicating that IFR 
rejections had occurred at the block, district, or state level committees. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table	  3:	  Tests	  of	  bivariate	  relationships	  between	  IFR	  status	  and	  key	  household	  characteristics	   









Household	  size	  (n=200)	   Median	  	   6	  	   6	  (n=106)	   6	  	  (n=94)	   0.3508	  
Female-­‐headed	  HHs	  	   	  
(n=200)	  
Frequency	   11.00%	   13.21%	   8.51%	   0.289	  
Education	  (n=200)	   	  
Head’s	  educational	  attainment	  	  (years)	   Median	   0	  (n=200)	   2	  (n=106)	   0	  (n=94)	   0.6247~~	  
Highest	  educational	  attainment	  per	  
household	  	  (years)	  
Median	   11	  	   11	  	   12	  	   0.5931~~	  
Head’s	  educational	  attainment	  	  (years)	  
at	  time	  of	  application	  	  
Median	   0	  	   2	  	   0	  	   0.6605~~	  
Employment	  (n=200)	   	  
#	  of	  working	  members	  21	  per	  
household	  	  
Median	   4	  (n=200)	   4	  (n=106)	   4	  (n=94)	   0.5493	  ~,	  
0.6131~~	  
HHs	  with	  farming	  members	   Frequency	   98.51%	  	   97.17%	  	   100%	   0.104	  
HHs	  with	  salaried	  members	   Frequency	   10.50%	  	   12.26%	   8.51%	   0.387	  
HHs	  with	  own	  business	  	   Frequency	   4.0%	   4.72%	   3.19%	   0.583	  
Migration	  (n=200)	   	  
HH%	  with	  migrant	  members	  (away	  
less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  6	  months)	  
Frequency	   72.00%	   72.64%	   71.28%	   0.830	  
Private22	  land	  ownership	  	   	  
Fertile23	  private	  land	  (acres)	   Median	   0.20	  n=(197)	   0.20	  (n=104)	   0.15	  (n=93)	   0.4425~~	  
Less	  fertile24	  private	  land	  (acres)	   Median	   0.5	  	  (n=197)	   0.5	   0.5	   0.9629~~	  
Total	  private	  land	  (acres)	  	   Median	   1	  (n=197)	   0.94	   1	   0.7603~~	  







Forestland	  applied	  for	  (acres)	   Median	   2	  (n=178)	   2	  (n=90)	   2.8	  (n=88)	   0.0046~~**	  
Forestland	  approved	  for	  IFR	  rights	  
(acre)	  	  
Median	   	   n/a	   0.7125	  
(n=88)	  
n/a	  
House	  conditions	  (n=200)	  
Cement	  walls	  and	  metal	  roof	  (pukka)	  	   Frequency	   2.01%	   1.93%	   2.13%	   0.911	  
Room	  count	  	   Median	   3	   3	   3	   	  0.0282	  	  ~,	  *	  
0.0020~~	  	  **	  	  
Group	  membership	  (n=200)	  
%	  HHs	  with	  1	  +	  group	  members	   Frequency	   14.00%	   13.83	  %	   14.15%	   0.948	  
Local	  government	  membership	  (n=200)	  
HHs	  with	  Gram	  Panchayat	  member	   Frequency	   1.50%	   1.89%	   1.06%	   0.633	  
HHs	  with	  Joint	  Forest	  Management	  
committee	  member	  
Frequency	   10.50%	   7.55%	   	  13.83%	   0.148	  
HHs	  with	  Forest	  Rights	  Act	  committee	  
member	  
Frequency	   7.00%	   5.66%	   	  	  8.51%	   0.430	  
*significant	  at	  .05	  level	  **Significant	  at	  .01	  level	  	  	  
~	  t-­‐test	  result	  	  ~~	  Wilcoxon	  rank	  sum	  result	  (no	  mark	  indicates	  Chi-­‐2	  result)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  HH	  members	  with	  primary	  occupation	  other	  than	  studies,	  retirement,	  or	  convalescence.	  	  
22	  Private	  land	  owned	  by	  an	  individual	  household	  member	  and	  assigned	  a	  survey	  number.	  	  
23	  Piyat	  layak:	  Arable	  land	  with	  access	  to	  water	  and	  a	  gentle	  slope;	  i.e.	  fairly	  productive.	  	  
24	  Binpiyat	  layak:	  Arable	  land	  that	  is	  steep	  and/or	  dry,	  but	  still	  used	  for	  farming,	  i.e.	  low	  production.	  Households	  can	  covert	  




	   The IFR and non-IFR households displayed few differences in economic 
characteristics. There was a statistically significant difference in on-farm income between 
households according to IFR status (p=0.0094) but not in total income (p=0.5933). There was 
not evidence of a significant correlation between IFR status and either the duration or the 
occurrence of food insecurity (p=0.8163, p=0.1222).  
Table	  4:	  Measures	  of	  economic	  wellbeing	  and	  bivariate	  relationships	  with	  IFR	  status	  








Test	  used	   P	  value	  
Annual	  Income	  (n=200)	  
On-­‐farm	  income	  (Rs.)	   Median	  	   0	   0	   0	   Wilcoxon	  rank	  
sum	  
0.0094*	  
Total	  Income	  (Rs.)	   Median	  	   12,937.50	   11,400	   14,725	  	  	  	   Wilcoxon	  rank	  
sum	  
0.5933	  
Food	  insecurity	  	  
HHs	  with	  food	  	  
insecurity	  






Chi-­‐squared	   0.1222	  
Months	  of	  food	  
insecurity	  (out	  of	  12)	  




	  *=significant	  at	  .05	  level.	  **=significant	  at	  .01	  level	  ***=significant	  at	  .001	  level	  
	   	  
	   Some households had received government benefits in the year prior to data 
collection, such as subsidized electric borewells from the Gram Panchayat, subsidized seeds 
from a local NGO-government partnership, irrigation assistance from the state-level 
Integrated Watershed Management Program (IWMP), field leveling by Gujarat Land 
Development Corporation, or a house renovation subsidy from the national Indira Awas 
Yojana or Sardar Awas Yojana (the Indira Gandhi and Sardar Patel Shelter Projects). 
Participation ranged from 3% in IWMP to over 27% for the housing subsidy (Table 5). 
Households with IFR had accessed the borewell and housing subsidies significantly more 
than households without land rights (p=0.019, p=0.007, Table 5). 
Table	  5:	  Frequency	  of	  government	  benefits	  and	  their	  relationships	  to	  IFR	  status	  (Chi-­‐squared	  tests)	  





Subsidized	  borewell	  	   10.55	  	  (n=199)	   5.71	  (n=105)	   15.96	  (n=94)	   0.019*	  
Discount	  seeds	   	  14.65	  (n=198)	   18.27(n=104)	   10.64%	  (n=94)	   0.129	  
Irrigation	  assistance	   3.02	  (n=199)	   3.81	  	  (n=105)	   2.13	  (n=94)	   0.489	  
Leveling	  of	  fields	   5.53	  	  (n=199)	   4.76	  	  (n=105)	   6.38	  (n=94)	   0.617	  
House	  renovation	  subsidy	   27.14	  (n=199)	   19.05	  	  	  	  (n=105)	   36.17	  (n=94)	   0.007**	  






3.3 Logistic Regressions 
3.3.1 Subsidized Borewell Model	  
	   I used logistic regression to model a household’s likelihood of receiving a subsidized 
borewell. My goal was to see if the correlation between IFR and the subsidy (Table 5) 
persisted after controlling for measures of social and political capital and household 
characteristics. Given the semi-arid climate, the borewell was highly sought-after in this area. 
Each village’s Gram Panchayat, particularly the sarpanch (president), oversaw the process 
of granting these subsidies.	  
𝑝(𝐵) =
1
1 + 𝑒!(!!  !  !!∗!"#  !  !!∗!  !  !!∗!"#  !  !!∗!"#  !  !!∗!"  !  !!∗!)
  
Where: 
p(B): probability of receiving subsidized borewell; IFR: dummy variable for IFR 
approval; G: number of groups in which household participates; JFM: dummy 
variable for membership in Joint Forest Management Committee; FRC: dummy 
variable for membership in Forest Rights Committee; ED: household head’s 
education (years); P: amount of fertile private land (guntha25); and β0: constant 
 The logistic model demonstrates that a positive correlation between IFR rights and 
participation in the borewell program persists after controlling for measurements of social 
capital local government participation, education of the household head and wealth 
(measured by fertile private land) (p=0.038, Table 6). The households with IFR are more 
likely to have also received a borewell, regardless of the social and political resources that 
would typically influence its access to such programs. 
 Table	  6:	  Logistic	  regression	  model	  of	  a	  household’s	  likelihood	  of	  receiving	  a	  subsidized	  borewell	  (n=196) 
Explanatory	  variables	   Coefficient	   P	  value	  
IFR	  status	  	   1.099776	  	  	   0.038*	  
#	  of	  groups	  	   0.5380317	  	  	  	   0.128	  
Member	  in	  JFM	  Committee	   -­‐0.5211435	  	  	  	   0.565	  	  	  
Member	  in	  Forest	  Rights	  Committee	   0.4032976	  	  	  	   0.644	  	  	  
Household’s	  education	  attainment	  (years)	   -­‐0.0564655	   0.264	  
Fertile26	  private	  land	  (guntha)	   -­‐0.0225458	   0.184	  
Constant	   -­‐2.409769	   0.000**	  
Goodness	  of	  fit	  measures	  
Pseudo	  R-­‐squared	   0.0719	   -­‐	  
Percent	  predicted	  correctly	  	   89.80%	   -­‐	  
*=significant	  at	  .05	  level.	  **=significant	  at	  .01	  level	  ***=significant	  at	  .001	  level	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  1	  guntha=1/40	  acre	  




 This model predicts a household’s participation in the borewell program correctly 
89.80% of the time (Table 6). A household with IFR is 8.3-9.6% more likely to have received 
a subsidized borewell than an identical household without IFR (p=0.027, p=0.041, Table 7).   
The model was robust, with IFR status having a significant and positive relationship with 
borewell participation in spite of the addition and subtraction of additional regressors. The 
relationship was also significant and positive in parallel probit models (Appendix). 
Table	  7:	  Marginal	  effects	  of	  IFR	  other	  variables	  on	  receiving	  a	  subsidized	  borewell	  
Explanatory	  variables	   Average	  marginal	  effect	  (at	  means)	   Average	  marginal	  effect	  
	   AME	  at	  means	   P	  value	   AME	   P	  value	  
IFR	  status	   0.0830802	   0.027*	   0.0957738	  	  	   0.041*	  
#	  of	  groups	  	   0.0406445	  	  	   0.119	  	  	   0.0468544	  	  	   0.119	  
Member	  in	  JFM	  Committee	   -­‐0.0393687	   0.563	   -­‐0.0453837	   0.565	  
Member	  in	  Forest	  Rights	  Committee	   0.0304663	   0.644	   0.0351211	   0.644	  
Household	  head’s	  educational	  
attainment	  	  (years)	  
-­‐0.0042656	   0.258	   -­‐0.0049173	   0.266	  
Fertile	  private	  land	  (guntha)	   -­‐0.0017032	  	  	   0.156	   -­‐0.0019634	  	  	   0.188	  
*=significant	  at	  .05	  level.	  **=significant	  at	  .01	  level	  ***=significant	  at	  .001	  level	  
 To conclude, my data demonstrate a strong link between having IFR and receiving an 
subsidized borewell recently, but further studies are needed. As documented in Bose 2011, 
there may be an outright causal link between the two, since IFR legitimizes a once-illegal 
behavior, and the title documents provide proof that a farmer owns the land on which he or 
she wishes to have a borewell. The benefits of irrigated land include more reliable harvests, 
higher yields, and the ability to plant more water-intensive cash crops. An important caveat is 
that the majority of households with bore wells had not participated in the scheme in the past 
year (68.1% of households), meaning many villagers borewell with their own money or 
accessed the subsidy years before. 
3.3.2 House Renovation Subsidy Model 
	   I created a logistic regression model to estimate a household’s probability of having 
received a house renovation subsidy under Indira or Sardar Awas Yojana.  
𝑝(𝐻) =
1
1 + 𝑒!(!!  !  !!∗!"#  !  !!∗!  !  !!∗!"#  !  !!∗!"#  !  !!∗!"  !  !!∗!)
 
Where: 
p(H): probability of household receiving a housing subsidy; IFR: dummy variable 
for IFR approval; G: number of groups in which household participates; JFM: 
dummy variable for membership in Joint Forest Management Committee; FRC: 
dummy variable for membership in Forest Rights Committee; ED: household head’s 




 I found a positive and significant correlation between having IFR land rights and 
participation in the housing program(s) (p=0.009, Table 8) after controlling for 
measurements of group membership, local government committee participation, education, 
and wealth. There was also a significant negative relationship between the educational 
attainment of the household head and receiving the subsidy (p=0.008, Table 8), meaning 
household heads with lower education were more likely to receive this subsidy. The model 
was also robust, with IFR status having a significant and positive correlation with the 
housing subsidy in robustness checks (Appendix).  
Table	  8:	  Logistic	  regression	  model	  of	  a	  household’s	  likelihood	  of	  receiving	  home	  renovation	  subsidy	  
(n=196)	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	   P	  value	  
IFR	  status	   0.9076547	   0.009*	  
#	  of	  groups	   -­‐0.08184	   0.811	  
Member	  in	  JFM	  Committee	   0.8424624	  	  	   0.140	  
Member	  in	  Forest	  Rights	  Committee	   -­‐0.3764958	   0.607	  
Household	  head’s	  educational	  attainment	  	  (years)	   -­‐0.1001423	   0.008**	  
Fertile	  private	  land	  (acres)	   0.0000797	   0.990	  
Constant	   -­‐1.148336	   0.000***	  
Goodness	  of	  fit	  measures	  
Pseudo	  R-­‐squared	   0.0816	   -­‐	  
Percent	  predicted	  correctly	  	   73.47%	   -­‐	  
*=significant	  at	  .05	  level.	  **=significant	  at	  .01	  level	  ***=significant	  at	  .001	  level	  
	   A household with IFR is 16.2-16.9% more likely to have received a housing subsidy 
than a household without IFR but with the same level of social capital, government 
participation, education, and wealth (p=0.007, p=0.005, Table 9). The likelihood of getting 
this benefit declines by 1.8-1.9% for each additional year of education of a household head 
(p=0.006, p = 0.005, Table 9).  
Table	  9:	  Marginal	  effects	  of	  IFR	  status	  and	  other	  variables	  on	  receiving	  house	  renovation	  subsidy	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Average	  marginal	  effect	  (at	  means)	   Average	  marginal	  effect	  
	   AME	  at	  means	   P	  value	   AME	  at	  means	   P	  value	  
IFR	  status	   	  	  0.1688269	  	  	   0.007**	   0.162295	   0.005**	  
#	  of	  groups	   -­‐0.0152225	   0.811	   -­‐0.0146336	   0.811	  
Member	  in	  JFM	  Committee	   0.1567009	   0.139	  	  	   	  0.1506382	   0.133	  
Member	  in	  Forest	  Rights	  
Committee	  
-­‐0.0700295	   0.607	   -­‐0.0673201	   0.606	  
Household	  head’s	  educational	  
attainment	  	  (years)	  
-­‐0.0186268	  	  	   0.006**	   	  	  -­‐0.0179061	   0.005**	  
Fertile	  private	  land	  (guntha)	   0.0000148	   	  0.990	   =0.0000142	  	  	   0.990	  




 To conclude, my data demonstrate a strong link between having IFR and receiving a 
housing subsidy. Some of the 135 households I personally surveyed commented that their 
house itself was located on forestland, an illegal occupation in the absence of IFR. IFR 
legalizes these households, opening the door but not necessarily guaranteeing access to this 
government benefit. I did not distinguish between houses built on private and IFR land; 
further studies are needed to evaluate causation. 
 
3.4 Linear Regressions 
3.4.1 On-farm Income Model 
 I developed an OLS Multivariate Linear Regression Model income to approximate 
the relationship between a household’s IFR status and its annual on-farm income. 
On-farm Income = β0 + β1*IFR + β2*BP land + β3*P land + β4*IFR land + β5*Bore + 
β6*Spray + β7*Pump + β8*Seed+ β0 
Where: 
IFR: dummy variable for IFR; BP: amount of less fertile private land (guntha); P land: 
amount of fertile private land (guntha); IFR land: amount of IFR-approved land27; 
Bore: dummy variable for owning a borewell; Spray: dummy variable for fertilize 
or/pesticide sprayer; Pump: dummy variable for irrigation pump; Seed: dummy variable 
for subsidzed seeds; and β0: constant	  
Table	  10:	  Multivariate	  OLS	  Linear	  Model	  for	  On-­‐farm	  Income	  
Explanatory	  variable	  	   Coefficient	   Standard	  error	   P	  value	  
IFR	  status	  	   796.5573	   662.4398	   0.231	  
Less	  fertile	  private	  land	  (guntha28)	   5.06456	  	  	   7.006494	   0.473	  
Fertile	  private	  land	  (g)	   54.22874	  	  	   14.6784	   0.000***	  
IFR	  approved	  land	  (g)	   -­‐8.115114	   8.99082	   0.368	  
Borewell	  	   54.98123	   587.3201	   0.986	  
Fertilizer/pesticide	  sprayer	  	   522.9936	   854.1016	  	  	   0.541	  
Irrigation	  Pump	  	   1314.547	   646.067	   0.043*	  
Subsidized	  seeds	  	   3596.49	   829.9786	   0.000***	  
Constant	   -­‐678.8262	   563.4502	   0.230	  
Observations	  used	   188	  (excludes	  HHs	  that	  answered	  “don’t	  know”	  for	  any	  of	  above	  variables)	  
R-­‐squared	   .2434	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐squared	   .2096	  
*=significant	  at	  .05	  level	  ***	  significant	  at	  0.001	  level	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Has	  value	  of	  0	  if	  the	  household	  doesn’t	  have	  IFR	  





 There is a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between a household’s 
on-farm income and IFR status (Table 10). There is a negative but insignificant relationship 
between income and the amount of IFR land approved. A one-guntha increase in a 
household’s fertile private land is associated with a Rs. 54 increase in annual on-farm income 
(p=~0.000). According to the model, a household with subsidized seeds is predicted to earn 
approximately Rs. 3,600 (p=~0.000) more per year compared to an identical household 
without those seeds. Having an irrigation pump drawing water from a stream or open well is 
correlated with a Rs. 1,315 increase 
(p=0.043). The positive association 
between the amount of fertile land and 
income was robust (p=~0.000) across 
numerous iterations of the model, 
when I added variables such as the 
amount of IFR land. Overall, upon 
accounting for inputs such as seeds 
and fertile land, the IFR appears to 
have had no effect on farm income 
(Table 10). 
	   	  However this model’s 
explanatory power is limited. It 
explains only ~21% to 24% of the 
variability in actual on-farm income 
(R2=0.2434, adjusted R2=0.2096, Table 10) Furthermore, the autocorrelation in its residual 
plot indicates that additional, unobserved explanatory variables play a major role in a 
household’s on-farm income (Fig. 4). 
3.4.2 Life Satisfaction Score Model 
 I developed an OLS Multivariate Linear Regression Model for an individual 
respondent’s life satisfaction score (1-10) to approximate its relationship with a household’s 
IFR status. Only one respondent in each household answered the life satisfaction question.  
Life satisfaction = β1*IFR + β2*BP land + β3*P land + β4*Sal + β5*Day + β6*Fan + 
β7*Mob …+ β0 
Where IFR: dummy variable for Individual Forest Rights; BP: amount of less fertile 
binpiyat private land (guntha29); P: amount of fertile piyat private land (g): Sal: dummy 
variable for salaried employees in the household; Day: dummy variable for day laborers 
in the household; Fan: number of fans owned; Mob: 
number of mobile phones owned; and β0: constant 
Table	  11:	  Coefficients	  of	  Linear	  Model	  for	  Life	  satisfaction	  score	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  1	  guntha	  =	  1/40	  acre.	  A	  local	  unit	  of	  measure	  used	  in	  this	  model	  because	  land	  amounts	  are	  so	  low.	  






Explanatory	  variable	  for	  Life	  
Satisfaction	  (1-­‐10)	  	  
Coefficient	   Standard	  error	   P	  value	  
	  
IFR	  status	  	   -­‐0.4753367	   0.2515821	   0.060	  
Less	  fertile	  private	  land	  (guntha30)	   -­‐0.0027978	   0.003036	  	  	   0.358	  
Fertile	  private	  land	  (g)	   0.0093227	  	  	   0.0049264	   0.060	  
Salaried	  employment	  	   0.9853317	   0.4167	   0.019*	  
Day	  labor	  	  	   -­‐0.5304525	   0.2768771	  	  	   0.057	  	  	  
#	  of	  fans	   0.5768966	   0.2324111	   0.014*	  
#	  of	  mobile	  	  phones	   0.5777731	   0.2399079	   0.017*	  
Constant	   3.400593	  	  	   0.3961374	   0.000***	  
Observations	  used	   187	  (excludes	  HHs	  whose	  respondents	  didn’t	  assign	  a	  number	  to	  their	  
satisfaction)	  
R-­‐squared	   0.2107	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐squared	   0.1799	  
 
There is a negative but insignificant relationship between life satisfaction and IFR 
status (p=0.060) and between anyone in the household doing day labor, an unpopular means 
of livelihood (p=0.057, Table 10).  Meanwhile, anyone in the household having salaried 
employment is correlated with an increase in the respondent’s score by 0.985, almost a full 
point (p=0.019). This echoes interviews in which respondents declared they would have more 
“satisfaction” or “contentment” in life if their educated children could secure a salaried job. 
Having one additional cell phone or a fan are each correlated with a ~0.57 point increase in 
life satisfaction score (p=0.014; p=0.017). 
  However, this linear regression 
model explains only ~18-20% of the 
variability in actual life satisfaction 
scores (R2=0.2107, adjusted R2=0.1799, 
Table 10). The strong linear trend and 
autocorrelation in the model’s residual 
plot indicate that additional, unobserved 
explanatory variables have major roles 
in someone’s life satisfaction (Fig 5).  
The literature on life satisfaction and 
other measures of wellbeing cautions 
that these are complex concepts, heavily 
influenced by subjective factors like 
family harmony and self-efficacy, and 
concepts of individual versus communal 
well-being unique to an Indian adivasi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  1	  guntha	  =	  1/40	  acre.	  I’m	  using	  this	  instead	  of	  acres	  because	  the	  land	  amounts	  are	  so	  low,	  and	  it’s	  the	  term	  respondents	  
used.	  




community (White, Gaines, and Jha 2013).  The lack of correlation between life satisfaction 
and the respondent’s demographic characteristics, which I tested separately, suggests that this 






 4.1 “These rights have no use!” 
 Overall, adivasi households with and without Individual Forest Rights had few 
statistically significant differences in their economic or subjective wellbeing (Table 3, 10, 
11). Although the households with IFR had significantly different on-farm income (Table 3), 
this relationship was not significant once I factored in the size of fertile private land 
(p=~0.000) and access to subsidized seeds (p=~0.000, Table 10). Furthermore, there was no 
significant difference in the occurrence of food insecurity nor its duration (Table 3) – even 
though “ensuring livelihood and food security” is an explicit goal of the Forest Rights Act 
(Government of India 2006).  
 In their own words, IFR has provided few economic benefits to the adivasi people in 
these five villages in Santrampur. When asked directly, only a few of the households with 
IFR reported economic improvement. (Those who did not have IFR did anticipate 
improvements in agricultural production). Even the officers of the Forest Rights Committees, 
who volunteered to implement the law, felt IFR yielded little change. In village 4, the 
committee secretary opined, “There is no change – only that some people received a title 
certificate. We’ve found no other difference… No facilities have been given on that [IFR] 
land yet… no water, no borewells, no assistance in building houses, nor any other help…” 
(Village 4). Another committee’s president lamented that his own application was rejected, 
but when we asked about the benefits of IFR, he said: 
 “These rights have no use! Look… even if we did not get rights to farm the forestland 
under the FRA, it would be the same situation. As for real development, for growth, for 
solutions?! Neither the government, the NGOs, nor the office in charge of the Forest 
Rights Act is giving us any information about meaningful development schemes!”  
(FRC president, Village 5) 
 Like the studies reviewed in van der Molen’s (2016) critique of de Soto (2000), my 
data call into question the economic benefits of formalization of agricultural land rights. 
These results differ from earlier studies in Ethiopia, Asia and Latin America where 
formalization caused, or was at least correlated with, improved household economic 
indicators (Holden and Ghebru 2013; Lawry et al. 2014). One difference between those 
tenure reforms and the Forest Rights Act is that the IFR are not alienable by sale, and thus, 
my respondents could not neither mortgage their land nor sell it.  
 My quantitative and qualitative results resemble the studies on formalization in sub-
Saharan Africa (Nyamu-Musembi 2007; Perz et al. 2014). According to Lawry et al. (2014), 
“gains to formalization in Africa may be more limited because tenure insecurity, which 
formalization seeks to remedy, is often not present to the degree that the designers of reform 




Unlike most forest communities (Das 2013, Bandi 2015a), these villagers farmed relatively 
freely before the Forest Rights Act came into force. 
4.2 Pre-existing Tenure Security 
 As described above, the Indian Forest Department was a major source of tenure 
insecurity for adivasis before the Forest Rights Act of 2006 (Pimple and Sethi 2005; Sarin 
2014). However, the Forest Department stopped asserting its rights over forestland in 
Santrampur block, Gujarat, at least a decade before my fieldwork began. According to a 
household in village 3, the Forest Department stopped fining farmers in 1992, a claim 
corroborated by our examination of fine receipts.  Numerous interviewees had been extorted, 
beaten, or otherwise intimidated by the Department – but only 10, 15 or even 20 years ago. 
The secretary of Village 5’s FRC explained, “Before, we were frightened of men in khaki 
trousers --in other words, of the police. So we didn’t do much farming on the forest. 
Everyone was scared of them. We had so little awareness. We were so scared that we’d run 
and hide at the sight of anyone in trousers!” His female relative interjected. “But for the past 
10 or 12 years, we’ve been aware – we’ve been awoken!” His counterpart in Village 3 
reported that the Forest Department had not interfered with forest farming since 2005 or 
2006. The villagers in Village 4 had convinced the Department to allow them to farm the 
forest in the 1980s, on the heels of displacement by a dam and a botched compensation plan. 
 The FRC interviewees described the local Forest Department’s involvement in the 
IFR process as ranging from "helpful" to "disengaged" unlike the obstructionism in other 
parts of the country (Sarin 2014). Ms. Kanjani and I only saw one Forest Department official 
in over two months of living in the field.  As a resident of Village 3 said, “No Forest 
Department official is seen here! They do not even come to do patrols of the forest” i.e. the 
most basic duty of the Department. Finally, the Forest Department in this Santrampur had 
apparently never resorted to extreme measures; evictions and crop destruction were unheard 
of even according to respondents who had a dim impression of the Forest Department.  The 
absence of enforcers and enforcement of forest law is atypical (Pimple and Sethi 2005; Das 
2013). 
 Some respondents mentioned that a forester had recently prevented them from 
clearing additional land, but such new farmland would not have been eligible for IFR 
anyway. 88% of all households reported currently farming on land to which they did not have 
rights.  They were open in admitting this illegal activity to me, Ms. Kanjani, and the 
enumerators. The IFR transfers ownership from the state to local people, but in Santrampur, 
the state seemed to have ceded de facto control long before. As scholars observed in certain 
parts of Africa, higher levels of tenure security than those typical of an adivasi community 
may explain why the evidence of the effects of the Forest Rights Act was so sparse here. 





4.3 Size and Productivity of IFR Land 
Another explanation for the divergence from some earlier students is that so little land 
was actually covered by the IFR. When we asked whether Village 2 had received IFR had 
experienced any improvement in their wellbeing, its FRC president responded: 
 “Improvements in their lives? What improvements? Sister, how much land has the 
government approved [under IFR]? 10 guntha? 12 guntha? 40 guntha? That’s only 
one acre of land. Some people have received more than one acre – two acres, three 
acres, four acres -- but that’s all. No one in the village has been approved for more 
than four acres. [IFR] hasn’t been enough to prevent these families from needing to 
migrate to sustain themselves. There has not been a major improvement.” 
 These comments find confirmation in the quantitative data: The median amount of 
IFR land approved was less than ¾ of an acre (Table 3). 10% of approved households 
received less than 10% of their request, 50% received less than one-quarter of their request, 
and 75% received less than half of their request. The amount of land to which people are 
given rights could be too small to make a detectable difference in their farm income or food 
security, particularly if the land is not highly fertile (piyat layak). The sample consisted of 94 
households with IFR, but those rights cover only a modest amount of land.  A widespread 
complaint, corroborated by Bandi (2015a), was that the Forest Department was arbitrarily 
limiting the size of IFR parcels. 
 Furthermore, some of forestland in these villages is of limited productive value. 
Households with IFR repeatedly described their forestland as “binpiyat layak” (not very 
fertile), “stony,” “steep,” and “not good for much.”   In certain villages, the forestland was so 
hilly that “dungar” (“hill”) was synonymous with “government forestland.” In the absence of 
level land and irrigation, such forestland was only suitable for corn, which yielded our 
respondents extremely low price in the market. Interviewees from Village 4 repeatedly 
referenced the poor quality of their private land in answering questions about their wellbeing, 
emphasizing how difficult it was to plant. At this stage, is it unsurprising that changing the 
rights regime over a sliver of forestland would lead to changes in food security, let alone 
farm income. 
Rather than forest rights, concerns about irrigation loomed large in our survey 
respondents’ comments on their life satisfaction, just as owning irrigated land had a strong 
correlation with on-farm income in my linear model (p=~0.000, Table 10).  
“If we get an irrigation system, then it would be good; leveling the land is good… 
these things would improve our lives.” (Village 4) 
 “We need an irrigation facility for development.” (Village 2) 
“None of the land in this village is piyat layak. If our family had piyat layak land, 




4.4 Government Benefits  
 Households that had secured Individual Forest Rights were significantly more likely 
to have received a subsidized borewell or a house renovation subsidy in the year prior to data 
collection.  Regardless of its social and political capital,31 a household with IFR was 
approximately 8.9% more likely to have a subsidized borewell and approximately 16.5% 
more likely to have a housing subsidy. Since applications for these benefits require the 
applicant to prove ownership of the farmland or the house in question, it is possible that 
having an IFR title helped a household receive these subsidies. A handful of survey and 
interview respondents mentioned that IFR had or would ease their access to these benefits, 
similar to the expectations of other Bhil IFR applicants in nearby Rajasthan (Bose 2013). 
 Access to government subsidies could be a significant – and thus far, unrecognized – 
benefit of IFR.  Further research studies should distinguish between borewells and houses on 
former forestland (now under IFR) and wells and houses on private land, whose titles were 
not affected by the FRA. The households I surveyed may have been more likely to get both 
IFR and government benefits due to unobserved confounders, such as having complete 
documents, personality traits such as persistence, or unmeasured political clout.  
4.5 Future Research: Intangible Benefits 
 Given their ambivalence about its benefits, why did these Bhil families even apply for 
IFR? Applying for IFR requires considerable effort and cost: traveling to government offices, 
paying for copies of documents, gathering elders to testify to past land use, sketching maps, 
finding a literate helper, and, according to some interviewees, bribing the authorities. Perhaps 
the answer lies in intangible benefits, such as mental security, or the right to exclude others. 
 A few respondents appreciated that IFR includes the ability to exclude others: “We 
applied so that we can get the land nearby. If we don't get the rights, then someone else can 
come and cultivate on that land!” People mentioned their neighbors seizing titled private land 
and untitled forestland alike. One family we surveyed had allegedly murdered a member of 
another surveyed household in a land dispute, long before the FRA. Individual Forest Rights 
were not necessarily a solution: as Bose (2011) found in other Bhil villages, it sometimes 
amplified conflict. The Forest Department paused its work on IFR applications in one 
village, due to intense disputes between applicants. In another village, two brothers were 
arrested after a violent fight when a forester came to measure one brother’s IFR plot. Based 
on this limited information, conflicts over land rights both predated and followed the FRA. 
However, until I can fully analyze my interview transcripts or, even better, conduct 
additional interviews, the potential intangible value of IFR to these Bhil households remains 
inconclusive. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




4.6 Limitations  
 Unlike other adivasi communities, these five villages are well connected to civil 
society; they have worked with a local NGO on reforestation and livelihoods for the past 20 
years. The NGO played no direct role in IFR but thanks to their past work, the villagers may 
be better positioned to reap any IFR benefits than more isolated villages. Another limitation 
of is the lack of a random sample; the data thus underrepresent the larger villages. In 
addition, households may have responded differently to our enumerators than to my research 
assistant and me, who were familiar faces.32 Finally the validity of the life satisfaction 
question was limited by its position in the survey; it was strongly influenced by the preceding 
questions about assets (Table 11, OECD 2013).  
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 Gaining formal rights to forestland they were already using has yielded few 
measurable changes in economic or subjective wellbeing for indigenous adivasis in 
Santrampur, Gujarat. The Forest Rights Act has not, thus far, “ensur[ed] livelihood and food 
security” as promised in its preamble, whether due to pre-existing tenure security, or to the 
minute size of IFR parcels in these villages (Government of India 2006). However, 
interviews and conversations indicate that people’s enthusiasm for the law remains strong. 
Individual Forest Rights are a necessary but insufficient safeguard for the livelihoods of 
indigenous people in Santrampur. Ensuring the accurate measurement of IFR lands would be 
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Probit model of a household’s likelihood of receiving a subsidized borewell 
 I developed a probit model with the same variables as the logistic model (Table 6). 
This model provides qualitative support for my initial findings, as there was a positive and 
significant relationship between having IFR and a subsidized borewell in both models 
(p=0.32, Table A). The coefficients have same signs as both model’s coefficients (Table A, 
6). 
Table	  A:	  Probit	  model	  of	  a	  household’s	  likelihood	  of	  receiving	  a	  subsidized	  borewell	  (n=196)	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	   P	  value	  
IFR	  status	  	   0.5699714	   0.032*	  
#	  of	  groups	  	   0.3219937	  	  	  	   0.112	  
Member	  in	  JFM	  Committee	   -­‐0.3350225	   0.477	  
Member	  in	  Forest	  Rights	  Committee	   0.2957067	   0.509	  
Household’s	  education	  attainment	  (years)	   -­‐0.0329201	   0.219	  
Fertile33	  private	  land	  (guntha)	   -­‐0.0122474	   0.156	  
Constant	   -­‐1.369023	   0.000**	  
Goodness	  of	  fit	  measures	  
Pseudo	  R-­‐squared	   0.0759	   -­‐	  
Percent	  predicted	  correctly	  	   89.80%	   -­‐	  
*=significant	  at	  .05	  level.	  **=significant	  at	  .01	  level	  ***=significant	  at	  .001	  level 
 
Probit model of a household’s likelihood of receiving a housing subsidy 
I developed a probit model for the probability of receiving a housing subsidy, using 
the same explanatory variables as the logistic model in the Results section. This model 
provides qualitative support for the findings of the logistic model, as it also demonstrates a 
positive and significant relationship between receiving the housing subsidy and having IFR 
(p=0.008) and a negative relationship between the subsidy and the household head’s 
educational attainment (p=0.007, Table B). The coefficients of the probit model have the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table	  B:	  Probit	  model	  of	  a	  household’s	  likelihood	  of	  receiving	  a	  house	  renovation	  subsidy	  (n=196)	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	   P	  value	  
IFR	  status	   0.5384811	   0.008*	  
#	  of	  groups	   -­‐0.0678493	   0.744	  
Member	  in	  JFM	  Committee	   0.504703	   0.140	  
Member	  in	  Forest	  Rights	  Committee	   -­‐0.1966035	   0.637	  
Household	  head’s	  educational	  attainment	  	  
(years)	  
-­‐0.0558992	   0.007**	  
Fertile	  private	  land	  (acres)	   0.0000906	   0.981	  
Constant	   -­‐.7024472	   0.000***	  
Goodness	  of	  fit	  measures	  
Pseudo	  R-­‐squared	   0.0808	   -­‐	  
Percent	  predicted	  correctly	  	   73.47%	   -­‐	  
*=significant	  at	  .05	  level.	  **=significant	  at	  .01	  level	  ***=significant	  at	  .001	  level 
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